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C.	 PRUACE
Contract NAS9-9046, Spac ot
 Station Safety Study, which was conducted by
This documeit constitutes one volume of the final report prepared under
the Aerospace Systems Division )
 Aerospace Group ) The Boeing Company ) under
the direction of the Advanced Projects Officeo Advanced Missions Progran
Office ., Manned Spacecraft Center ., NASA. The objective of the study was
to develop a management tool for evaluating conceptual designs of future
manned space systems from a safety viewpoint. This objective was achievedJ	 4
through the application of methodical techniques, which are described
where necessary in appropriate volumes of this final report, for analyzing
space station safety problems. 'Mis work resulted in the development of
Crew Safety Guidelines which can be used in evaluating future space
station concepts.
In Phase I of the study ., the work was directed toward a broad class of.
spacestations, using several specific configurations as examples, and
considering both crew safety and mission accomplishment as safety goals.
In May 1969, the study
 was redirected by NASA into Phase II to provide
more direct support to the NASA Phase B Future Space Station Study,
considering only crew safety as the safety goal. To the extent possible,
the work done in Phase I was revised and adapted to Phase II and all
documents of this final report, except as otherwise noted, include the
results from both phases. In both phases the study scope included only
on-orbit -c3perations and not launch, boost, de-orbit ., and recovery opera-
tions ., or any operations of the logistics support system, except for
close-in rendezvous and docking operations.
The approach taken in the study was to examine the space station from the
viewpoint of safety only, with the intent of identifying as complete a
list as possible of those measures which should be taken to maximize crew
safety. Also, and especially in Phase II I
 the study dealt primarily with
station concepts, rather than specific designs -
 or hardware items. It was
not possible, and no attempt was made, to examine the impact of safety
measures on other important aspects of space station development, such as
cos t', design difficulty, or operational suitability. As station develop-
ment proceeds, trade studies between safety measures and other factors will
be required and management decisions must be made- as to the extent to which
other desirable features will be permitted to override safety measures.
The documents constituting the final studyreport are:
D2
-113070-4 1 Condensed Summary Report
• D2-113070-5, Crew Safety Guidelines, Volumes I and II
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• D2
-113070 -6 , Supporting Analyses
•	 Analysis of Operations
•	 Experiment Program
F
•	 Traffic Patterns Analysis
•	 Human Requirements ='
•	 Meteoroid Penetration
•	 D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram ixii6
•	 D2-113070-10, Fault Tree Analysis
•	 D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis
Other documents produced during the study but not part of the final
report axe:
•	 D2-113070-1, Detail Study flan (Phase I only)
•	 D2-113070-2, Midterm Oral Report
•	 D2-113070-3, Final Oral Report
•	 D2-113070 -7, Baseline Mission Description (Phase I only)
•	 D2-X13070_-8, Baseline System Description (Pha:te I only)
}v^
D2-113070-4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Title Page
Preface iii
Table of Contents v
1.0 Introduction 1
2.0 Study Objectives 3
3.0 Relationship to Other NASA Efforts 5
4.0 Method of Approach and Principal Assumptions 7
5.0 Basic Data Generated and Significant Results 13
6.0 Study Limitations 19
7.0 Implications for Research 21
Aw 8.0 Suggested Additional Effort 23
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Study Approach 8
Figure 2 Station/Base Concept 16
ic^
p
D2-13,3070-4
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Space Station Safety Study summarized in this document was performed.
during 1969 as one of a series of studies of space safety conducted by or
for the NASA. Unlike previous studies, in which the emphasis had been
directed toward actions to be taken af ter an emergency occurred, the
emphasis of this study was directed primarily toward defining measures
which would tend to prevent, or reduce the probability of, occurrence of
an emergency or hazardous condition.
The safety measures defined are expressed as a set of Crew Safety Guide-
lines which are published in their entirety, together with appropriate
cross-references, in a companion document, n2-113070-5. The guidelines
may be used as a checklist with which to evaluate the safety measures
included in, or omitted from, a spacecraft design. However, a more
valuable application would appear to be the use of the guidelines to
develop space station or base concepts in which crew safety is the primary
consideration. These concepts then would provide a safety baseline against
which ether desirable station features or aspects of station development
could be compared. An example of this sort: of application is described in
Section 5.0 of this document. Regardless of how applied, the sine qua_ non
for guidelines application is that management establish a strong safety
organization through which to plan and control the safety program.
The primary emphasis of the study, as stated above ., was directed toward
preventive, rather than remedial actions and the majority of the guidelines
reflect this emphasis. In addition, some attention was devoted to problems
of spacecraft damage containment and control and a set of guidelines which
are pertinent to that subject have been ideiitified. A brief discussion of
damage containment and control measures is included in Section 5.0 of this
docurr^ent.
	 -
Nothing was found in the study which would indicate that an acceptable
level of crew safety could not be attained within the current state of
the art. There are some instances ., however, in which uncertainties exist
or assumptions were made which indicate the desirability of further work.
The further work which seems desirable is listed and described briefly.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED.
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2.0 STUDY OBJECTIVES
In essence, there were two primary objectives throughout the study, which
were to find the answers to these closely related questions:
a. What measures must be taken to provide maximum assurance of safety in
future space stations, and
b. How can management be assured that proper consideration is given to
the safety measures identified by the answers to question "a"?
These objectives were achieved. by a methodical analysis of the safety
problems of a space station, during which. hazards were identified, a
means of safeguarding against each hazard was derived, and the safeguards
were expressed as Crew Safety Guidelines. Each guideline is a statement
that points the way toward a course of action which will enhance safety.
The study objectives are expressed more formally in the Statement of Work.
For Phase I the objectives were:
Development of safety guidelines and concepts that ensure astronaut
safety by examining and analyzing the crew activities carried out
during normal and emergency space station operations.
Investigation from both the astronaut safety and the space station
design standpoints of preventive and remedial safety problems associ-
ated with long-term operational space stations and the development of
safety procedural and design guidelines.
Development of damage containment and control procedures applicable
over broad classes of space stations
In Phase II the objectives were restated as:
The overall objective of this study is to develop a tool for guiding
and evaluating conceptual designs of future manned space systems from
a safety viewpoint. This objective will be achieved through applica-
tion of methodical techniques for analyzing the subject of manned
space systems safety. The techniques will be documented such that
they can be updated and/or modified in the future.
These techniques will result in the development of:
a) Safety guidelines which can be applied to the NASA Phase B Space
Station Activity.
b) Rationale and supporting engineering data for safety guidelines
and documentation of this data for ready reference by conceptual
designers.
NOTE: Damage containment is recognized as a',"basic eorsideration, but
will be developed as a solution-oriented output rather than'as a
specific task.
_3_
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3.0 REIATIOV4 jHIP TO OT 
	NASA EFFORTS
Up to the present time, safety has been an intrinsic part of the manned
space program through the use of highly reliable equipment, constant
vigilance by designers and engineers, and ., whenever possible, provisions
for an option to terminate or abort th:. mission if something goes wrong.
These measures undoubtedly will be continued in future manned space
programs, but some current factors, such as greatly increased mission
duration, larger crews, and reliance on a re-entry vehicle separate from
the space station, may dictate different or additional safety measures.
A series of safety-oriented studies, of which this Space Station Safety
Study is one, have been conducted to examine the safety problems of future
space programs.
The emphasis of previous studies has been on remedial actions to cope with
in-flight emergencies. A study by The Rand Corporation emphasized "...the
saving of lives after an emergency has occurred in space." Similarly ., a
study by the Aerospace Corporation was oriented to "Define potential
emergency conditions (and) examine the... feasibility of remedial concepts..."
Other studies, for example, one by Lockheed, have examined escape device
concepts. By contrast, the emphasis of this Safety Study was on measures
which should be taken to eliminate or minimize the probability, of the
occurrence of an emergency, or to mitigate the consequences if an emergency
did occur.
This study, especially in Phase 11, dealt with space station concepts and
functions, rather than with the hardware. While this placed some limita-
tions on the study, as will be discussed later, it also had the advantage
of making the study results broadly applicable to manned space programs in
general. The Crew Safety Guidelines,, then, while developed specifically
with a space station or base in mind, are, in general, sufficiently broad
to be applicable, at least as a starting point, to safety problems of any
other manned space programs, including logistics systems, shuttle vehicles,
and lunar or planetary exploration.
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a. Locating heuristically, as a basis for safety criteria, those bardware
and human functions which must be performed (or controlled) to maintain
crew safety, and
b. Developing a schema of implications as a basis for inferring the like-
lihood of crew safety, from concepts that are simpler and more easily
agreed upon than the general subject of crew safety itself.
The logic diagram is a set of related statements or if 	 arranged
in "tree" form and circumscribed by certain rules and logica l" procedures.
It was developed regressively (see Appendix I in D2-113070-9) from the
origin proposition, "All crew members will be safe during their orbital
stay," which was considered to express succinctly, and sufficiently
accurately, the overall context of the Safety Study._ Starting with the
origin proposition, logical development consisted of incrementally and
repeatedly making and recording decisions for each proposition concerning
assumptions as -to its truth or falsity, the implications both upward and
downward that were involved, subdivision through disjunctive or conjunctive
relationships, and numerous other considerations such as clarity of ex-
pression. The resulting tree of proposition statements was organized to
be reproducible on normal document pages, using specific geometric loca-
tions and logic symbology to express properly their logical relationships.
"End-point" and "open" propositions were recorded for future evaluation.
Document D2-113070-9 contains the entire diagram, together with detailed
explanations of all aspects of its development and interpretation.
Fault Tree Analysis
4
The systems safety fault tree analysis provides a graphic representation
of Boolean relationships between discrete normal and adverse situations'
which, taken singly or in combination ., could result in the development of
a specific undesired event. As a deductive technique it can be applied to
the investigation of either gross or detailed systems. The depth to which
it can be evolved is restricted only by the level of detail available.
On this study, the analytical effort resulted in gross, top-level fault
trees carried down only to major components or functions. Three specific
hazardous conditions were analyzed as extensions of certain proposition
statements derived in the logic diagram: decompression, temperature ex-
tremes
.
, and radiation. In brief, the fault tree analysis consists of
stating the basic undesired event; subdividing the problem into numerous
subsidiary undesired events by several different ., but appropriate, cate-
gories; stating all the necessary events which would cause each such sub-
sidiary undesired event; and reiterating the process until the most basic
identifiable causal events have been established. This procedure results
in a progressively expanding "tree" of events, organized to be ` reproducible
on normal document pages, whose relationships are shown by certain symbols
and interconnecting likes, as explained in D2-113070-10.
^. 9 r
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Subsystem Analysis
Subsystem analyses performed during this study consisted of two seg-^,rate
efforts, Phase I and Phase II. For Phase I it was conducted as a Failure,
Safety, and Maintenance Analysis on each subsystem, based on the Saturn V
Single Launch Space Station Study and was about 50 percent completed when
redirection of this study resulted in its termination. For Phase II the
analyses were oriented to the identification of hazards which could threaten
crew safety, leading to recommended safeguards necessary to prevent or
contain, these hazards. Safety guidelines based on the recommended safe-
guards were then derived (see D2-113070-5). The Phase II analysis -was not
constrained to any particular space station configuration, so most of the
work previously accomplished in Phase I was applicable and was used as a
baseline for the Phase II effort. The Failure, Safety, and Maintenance
Analysis conducted during Phase I was to have been performed at the compo-
nent level for each of the SVSLSS subsystems. Each of the components was
examined as to its function within the subsystem and its relationship to
other elements of the subsystem, as well as to other subsystems. Numerous
reference sources were reviewed to obtain appropriate hardware-information
for the analysis. Based on the information available, each component was
evaluated for failure modes which could result in a potential hazard to the
crew or mission. The potential hazards were analyzed to identify safety
provisions which would prevent or alleviate the hazard. Also, each condition
was examined for methods of detecting critical failures, and the maintenance
requirements for correcting such failures. The analysis was documented on
a form which combines the appropriate failure, safety, and maintenance
data compiled in Appendix A of D2-113070-11. Since the study concept during
Phase II was more universal in nature than that of Phase I, it was necessary
to expand the hazard summary to include consideration of other suboystem
configurations. Subsystem data available from reference material were
analyzed for potentially hazardous situations considered.- inherent in the
equipment or associated with its operation. As the potential hazards were
identified, they were analyzed to determine what safeguards should be
considered to prevent or alleviate them. Recommended safeguards are tabu-
lated in D2-113070-11 and form a basis for many of the guidelines included
in D2-113070-5-
Supporting Analyses
A series of relatively small tasks were undertaken in support or as-an
extension of the major analyses. These included:- design support in
developing configuration, concepts of the space station and base, an analy-
sis of operations, a traffic pattern analysis, human requirements support,
and an analysis of meteoroid penetration hazards.
In addition to the assumptions previously stated,, certain other assumptions
were made. They were:
All crew members will be capable of performing their assigned duties
in the space station or base.
- 10 -
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On their initial arrival at the space station or base, all crew members
will be in good health.
The station and base or components thereof will arrive in orbit in
proper working order and will remain in proper working order until
required by the crew.
^aECEDI
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5.0 BASIC DATA GENERATED )UM SIGNIFICANT RESULTS
The primary output of the study is a set of 282 Crew Safety Guidelines
which are contained in final report document D2-113070-5. A Crew Safety
Guideline is defined as:
A statement which points the way to a course of action which, if
taken, will tend to enhance crew safety in the space station or base.
In the report, each guideline appears only once, listed under an appropri-
ate hazard group. There are in addition a series of cross-references lead-
ing to other hazard groups to which the guideline may apply, the subsystems
affected by the guideline, guidelines pertinent to damage containment and
control, and key words appropriate to various guidelines.
Individually, each guideline expresses or suggests some measure which will
lessen the probability of occurrence of an undesired event or alleviate to
some degree a hazard. In the aggregate, they are a list of the things which
should be done to enhance crew safety and a checklist by which management
can review and evaluate accomplishment of the identified safety measures.
Whether used as individuals to implement some safety measure or in the
aggregate as a management checklist, however, the sine qua non for their
use is that management establish a strong safety organization. The guide-
lines can form the basis on which this organization can plan and control_
a viable safety rogram. In doing so though certain restrictions ory	 ^	 a
limitations on the use of the guidelines should be noted.
The first restriction is internal to each guideline as an individual and
derives from the basic approach to the study. By this approach, factors
o-uner than safety were not considered, and neither was the degree of risk
associated with the guideline determined. For each guideline, therefore,
some degree of trade study, at least on an informal basis, is indicated in
which the added safety increment obtained by application of the guideline
can be balanced against other factors.
A second restriction applies to the relationship between two or more guide-
"	 lines and derives from the fact that safety measures appropriate for one
hazard may be incompatible with safety measures appropriate for another
hazard. In these cases, a decision .,
--
-again involving trade studies, is
necessary to determine whether to apply only one guideline, to effect a__.
compromise between them, or possibly to adopt some other course.
In considering how best to apply the guidelines, several means suggest
themselves. Of these, the two extremes are to compare an existing and
final station design against.the guidelines, on the one hand, and to use
the guidelines in establishing initial concepts on which the design is
based, on the other hand. Of these extremes the latter is considered to
be by far the most useful, because guidelines in many cases are configura-
tion drivers, which must be incorporated early in the design stages if they
are to be of any value.
13
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To illustrate what has been said, consider the following guidelines and
their implications on station design:
7.7 Design of rotating spacecraft should be such that the direction
of major traffic flow is parallel to the vehicle spin axis.
12.13 The space station base areas inhabited by the crew should
consist of two or more independently pressurizable compartments with
more than one exit from each compartment.
12.30 Each compartment should have a minimum of two or more escape
routes which should not terminate in a common compartment.
12.18 The number of crew members in any compartment at one time
should be held to the minimum necessary to perform the required
functions.
12.20 The areas in which crew members spend the majority of their
time, e.g., staterooms, dining facilities, personal hygiene, exercise
and recreation areas, should be located and designed to be the safest
parts of the station.
In addition, there are numerous guidelines, not quoted here, which, if
applied, would require redundancy or duplication of many safety-critical
items.
Guideline 7.7 would dictate a long, slender, single-deck station so that
tangential and radial traffic would be minimized and major traffic flow is
axial. Such a configuration would likely be impractical for many reasons,
not the least of which are those concerning safety. In particular, while
a long, slender station could conceivably be divided into compartments as
required by Guideline 12.3.3, providing more than one exit from each com-
partment would be difficult and likely impossible in light of Guideline
12.30 which requires that the exits should not terminate in a common com-
partment.
In the interest of minimizing the number of crew members who might be
exposed to a particular hazard or emergency, Guideline 12.18 restricts the
number of crew members in any compartment. This is not consistent with a
finding of the study that crew members spend about two-thirds of their
time, and, hence, congregate, in those areas devoted to crew health m-id
well-being. Guideline 12.20, directed at this problem, specifies that
crew areas should be the safest parts of the station, implying a central
location. Here again, a long, slender station does i^ot appear readily
amenable to these requirements.
The net effect of the many guidelines dealing with redundancy is to
specify, very nearly, two stations, rather than one, but joined so as to
support each other. Stated differently, the station would consist of
two halves which can be largely, if not entirely, independent of each
other, but which can also 'provide each other with anything which is essen-
tial to crew survival.
14 -
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The ideas expressed in the foregoing are incorporated in the station concept
shown in Figure 2, which is the artificial-gravity portion of the space
base, but which could operate by itself as the zero-gravity space station.
It is essentially a Siamese twin, with the central bulkhead a pressure
bulkhead dividing the station into two halves. Each half has access to
the central, non-rotating hub (not shown) through its own elevator shaft.
Two nuclear power plants, also not shown, opposite the station would supply
power, with either one capable of powering the entire base. In addition,
each of the systems which is essential to crew safety would be duplicated
in each half and would have the capacity to serve both halves. The outer
shell is a pressure hull, the two end bulkheads are pressure bulkheads, and
the inner shell surrounding ?-he centrally located, two-deck crew quarters
is also a pressure shell. The major traffic flow direction is axial, with
tangential and radial traffic minimized, and with an elevator providing the
prime means of radial movement.
This concept was readily derived by successive application of the guidelines
and represents one approach to a .safety-optimized station. It provides a
baseline against which other factors, or other guidelines for that matter,
can be applied to establish the further compromises which may be necessary.
The major emphasis of the study was on preventive measures, e.g., those
things which would tend to prevent the occurrence of an emergency or reduce
the probability of its occurrence. However, preventive measures may, in
some cases, have Elements of remedial action as-well. ,also, certain features
^	 which are desirable to crew safety are also desirable from the viewpoint of
remedial action in an emergency. Necessarily, then, some attention was
devoted to problems of spacecraft damage containment and control, and
certain of the guidelines are appropriate to that matter.
The containment and control of damage requires three distinct phases,
although they may overlap or, in extreme emergencies, be conducted almost
simultaneously. These phases are identification, isolation, and counter-
action.
In the identify.=ration phase a determination is made that "damage" has
occurred. This requires detectors or sensors which measure a parameter of
interest and includes observation, inspection, and monitoring by crew
members, as well as instrumentation. It also requires that a,warning or
alarm system be available to inform the crew that something is amiss and
alert them to the need for further action. Depending on the seriousness of
the emergency, automatic action may be initiated at the same time that
warnings are given.
In the isolation phase, the damage and its effects are confined_ as much as
possible to the original site. This requires, first, that the station be
divided into several "compartments," but "compartments" in this sense
include any isolatable area, which may not necessarily be a separately
pressurizable area. Second, it requires that suitable hatches, valves,
shut-offs, and closures be provided so that the compartments can be
- 15 -
D2-113070-4
N+
\1
F--
a
wUZOU
W
U-,4
m
rO
dHN
N
41L
•r
Li
J
I ^
	
^
16
_'R;
17
D2-113070-4
isolated. Also included are concepts of isolated "safe" areas for the
conduct of hazardous operations or storage of hazardous materials, and
damage suppression devices such as crack stoppers in structure. Finally,
a means of protection for crew members in the area of the damage is
required.
The counteraction phase includes those actions necessary to remedy the
damage and return the station to normal operations, or at least to a "safe"
condition. A means to assure survival, escape, or rescue of crew members
from the damaged area is required. Access to and communications with the
da:raged area are necessary. A means of remedying the damage is required,
e.g., fire extinguishing systems, a method of repairing breeched pressure
hulls or bulkheads, and a means of clean-up and decontamination.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED.
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6.0 STUDY LMTATIOINS
The study, particularly in Phase II, was limited to consider only those
items which affect the safety of the crew. The broader system safety
concept, in which vehicle performance and mission accomplishment are
considered, was not included except to the extent, which may be consider-
able, that crew safety items also affect system safety. For example,
measures taken to preclude or extinguish fires in the interest of crew
safety would also be expected to enhance mission performance.
Only the on-orbit phase of the space station or base was examined. Launch,
boost, orbit injection, de- orbit, re-entry and recovery were not specifi
cally considered. Here again, however, a hazard associated with and
examined as part of on-orbit operation may also occur during other phases.
For example, loss of vehicle atmosphere or hazards associated with un-
restrained or shifting cargo may be expected in other phases of the total
mission. Measures appropriate against such hazards on-orbit may also be
appropriate in other phases.
The study was limited to considering concepts only and not specific hardware
items. This had the effect of restricting the depth of the investigation,
but has an offsetting advantage in that study results are broad and more
generally applicable than they would otherwise have been. Closely related
to this limitation is the fact that no laboratory or test work was accom-
plished during the study.
Finally, no reliability or probability numbers were established for or
derived during the study. This resulted in the consideration of and
development of guidelines to alleviate some hazards which may have a very,
low probability of occurrence. Again, however, it broadened the study in
that all identified hazards were carefully considered. There were two
exceptions to this limitation.. The first was the probability of a meteoroid
penetration, which the Statement of Work for the Phase B Future Space
_Station Study stipulated as the probability of no penetrations in a ten-
year-period (Po) = 0.9. The second exception was in the Logic Diagrams in
which it was felt necessary to end-point certain propositions as true or
false, and assign a numerical value to the confidence of their truth or
falsity. This value is expressed as a percentage, and was determined!'
subjectively.
c
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7.0 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
The area discussed in this section includes only matters which were out-
side the scope of the study. Therefore, nothing would have been done with
respect to them, even if time and resources had been available.
The study revealed no reason to believe that it was impossible to achieve
an acceptable level of crew safety in space stations or bases within the
current state of the art. Therefore, no urgent research is implied unless
future developments introduce hazards not currently known. There are,
however, some areas in which sufficient uncertainty exists or in which it
was necessary for us to make assumptions, to indicate the desirability of
further exploration.
In the area of toxicology allowable concentrations of toxic materials are
usually expressed. as Threshold Limit Values or maximum allowable concentra-
t'A.ons, but these are predicated on the basis of exposures of relatively
short duration. Allowable concentrations of toxin materials should be
determined for spacecraft, taking into account the long duration of the
exposure, the closed ecology of the spacecraft, the peculiar spacecraft
environment of zero or reduced gravity, oxygen tension, if different from
Earth :norm .l, increased particulate load, reduced pressures, noise, vibra-
tion, and the like.
Meteoroid penetration does not appear to constitute a great hazard ,  because
the probability of a meteoroid penetration is believed to be quite low. If
a penetration does occur, however, there is evidence to indicate that the
effects will be quite drastic. Furthermore, there appears to be consider-
able variation among the estimates of meteoroid flux. Further research is
considered desirable, both in the areas of meteoroid penetration effects on
stations or bases of the sizes and configurations planned and on the noimal
level and fluctuations of the meteoroid flux itself.
,*
For study purposes, it was assumed that crew members would be able to per-
form their assigned tasks with no degradation in performance during their
stay in the station or base. This does not teke into account the possible
detrimental effects on humans of long-term exposure to isolation, limited
space, hazardous environment, dependence on complicated means for life
support, gravity conditions radically different from those of Earth, and
the like. Research in this area is desirable, although it is recognized.
that it may be necessary for such research to be done concurrently with the
station or base operation.
Fire in the space station or base was considered to be a:major hazard and,
for study purposes, it was assumed that a fire, once initiated, would
continue to propagate unless remedial actions were taken. 'There"appears to
be some uncertainty as to the characteristics of fire in space stations,
particularly with respect to the effect of reduced or zero-gravity condi-
tions. Research in this area is indicated, both as to characteristics of
space station fires and the appropriate means of combatting them.
- 21 -
D2-113070-4
OCertain emergency conditions, such as massive contamination ) decompression.,
or fire, may occur that leave crew members exposed to the emergency with
short, but si&iificant, times in which to react. While devices such as
protective coveralls worn as the customary garb, oxygen masks, acid the like
would afford some protection in such situations, a device such as a full
pressure suit would be more desirable. Present pressure suits, however,
maot be individually fitted and require long times to don. Development of
a readily available, universal, quick-donning survival device is considered
highly desirable,
There is a posaibility that pressure walls and bulkheads may be damaged or
holed) with a resulting unacceptably high loss of station pressure. A
method of repairing damage to these pressure structures should be developed.
Most probably, the method must be one which can be accomplished by a crew
member during EVA or at least while wearing a full pressure suit.
,.e
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8.0 SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL EFFORT
The effort discussed in this section generally includes matters which are
eonsidered to be within the scope of the study but which could not be
covered within the time, resources, and information available.
As discussed in Section 5.0, th, ,,,
 evolved guidelines will require application
on the basis of a considerable series of trade studies. These include the
trades implicit in each guideline in which the safety increment added by
application of the guideline must be weighed against other significant
faetors, suck. as cost, weight )
 operational suitability, and the like. Also
included are the trades involving two or more guidelines which are to some
degree contradictory and the application of which requires the compromisov
of one or more of the guidelines. This effort ., it is expected, would con-
Unue throughout the design and development of the space station and base.
The crew safety problems associated with nuclear-fueled electrical power
vapplies were treated only in a general way in the study. The initial
inv.-% stigation into the nuclear safety problem indicated that the scope and
magnitude of the effort required was substantially greater than could be
made available during the study. It is suggested -Zkat a separate study,
at about the same level of effort as this safety study, sho, Lld be conducted
exclusively on the problem of nuclear power supply safety.
At Vhia early stage of space station development, the experiment program
for the station has not, of course, been defined in detail. Review of the
inforwation available on the experiment program did not reveal any safety
problems which had not already been examined in some other connection. In
the future, as the experiment program is better defined, a further safety
review is suggested to ensure that unanticipated safety problems do not.,
in fact, exist.
The Boeing Crew Activity SeTiencing Progr%m (GASP) is a computer program
which w^^is used in a limited application to traffic pattern problems during
the study. It is capable of much broader application 'to include the total
space station or base mission and the consideration of many factors, such
as power requirements, viewing targets ., crew skills ., and others. It is
suggested that CASP be uplated to include safety factors, the fat are ex-
periment program, and new req.,uirements imposed by the space station and
base ., and used as a means of reviewing and evaluating future programs,-
The Logic; Diagram was developed during the study as a rigorous technique
to reduce ambiguity, expose assuz%ptions, identify alternatives, and perm-'t
inferences as to the probability of various events. It is capable of
development to a greater level of detail. Also, it is amenable to the
preparation of a computer program which could be used to explore the effects
on safety of various assumptions )
 alternatives, or probabilities, and, thus,
reveal those critical safety areas which are most sensitive and to which-
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-tCfort should be directed. It is suggested that development of the Logic
Diagram be continued and a computer program based on it be prepared.
While examination of other space systems or programs was outside the scope
i-,t' the study, the safety problems of other programs are to a large degree
common to those considered during this study. The resUts of the study,
then, are also generally, applicable to other programs. It is suggested
that safety studies be initiated on other programs, for example, the space
^Iiuttle and lunar or planetary exploration programs, using the results of
thin study as a starting point.
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